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Abstract 
 
Recent finance literature highlights the role of technological change in increasing firm 
specific and aggregate stock price volatility (Campbell et al. 2001, Shiller 2000, Pastor 
and Veronesi 2005). Yet innovation data is not used in these analyses, leaving the direct 
relationship between innovation and volatility untested. Our aim is to investigate more 
closely the relationship between stock price volatility and innovation using firm level 
patent citation data. The analysis builds on the empirical work by Mazzucato (2002; 
2003) where it is found that stock price volatility is highest during periods in the industry 
life-cycle when innovation is the most ‘competence-destroying’.  Here we ask whether 
firms which invest more in innovation (more R&D and more patents) and/or which have 
‘more important’ innovations (patents with more citations) experience more volatility. We 
focus the analysis on firms in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries between 
1974 and 1999. Results suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between idiosyncratic risk, R&D intensity and the various patent related measures.  
Preliminary support is also found for the ‘rational bubble’ hypothesis linking both the 
level and volatility of stock prices to innovation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been increased attention, by both the economics profession 
and the popular press, on the topic of stock price volatility.  Interest peaked after the 
‘New Economy’ period when many high-tech stocks that were considered overvalued 
experienced a large drop in their share price.  But still now there persists the idea that 
the ‘knowledge economy’ (less unfashionable a term than the New Economy), has 
resulted in greater volatility, especially of small innovative firms which tend to go public 
earlier in their life-cycle than in previous times.  
 
Yet, in reality, there has been no trend increase of aggregate stock price volatility 
(Schwert 1989; 2002).  Particular periods have been characterized by high volatility, 
such as the 1970’s and the 1990’s, but the increase has not persisted.  Firm specific 
volatility has, on the other hand, experienced a trend increase over the last 40 years 
(Campbell et al. 2001).  Various works have highlighted technological change as one of 
the key factors responsible for this increase in firm specific risk, as well as the periodic 
increases of aggregate stock price volatility.  For example, Shiller’s work (2000) has 
shown that ‘excess volatility’, i.e. the degree to which stock prices are more volatile than 
underlying fundamentals, is highest in periods of technological revolutions when 
uncertainty is greatest.  Campbell et al. (2001) find that firm level idiosyncratic risk, i.e. 
firm specific volatility (as opposed to industry specific or market level), has risen since 
the 1960’s and claim that this might be due to the effect of new technologies, especially 
those related to the ‘IT’ revolution, as well as the fact that small firms tend now to go 
public earlier in their life-cycle when their future prospects are more uncertain.  And 
Pastor and Veronesi (2004) claim that the reason that high tech firms have prices that 
appear unjustifiably high (at the beginning of a ‘bubble’) is not due to irrationality, but due 
to the effect that new technology has on the uncertainty about a firm’s average future 
profits.  The basic idea behind all these works (reviewed further below) is that innovation, 
especially when ‘radical’, leads to high uncertainty hence more volatility. 
 
Yet none of these studies actually use innovation data.  Innovation is alluded to (e.g. the 
‘IT revolution’, the New Economy, radical change) but not measured, especially not at 
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the firm or industry level1.  The aim of our paper is to better understand the dynamics of 
stock price volatility by seeing whether we can in fact find evidence that stock price 
volatility is related to firm level innovation.  That is, we do not assume that volatility is a 
sign of greater uncertainty due to underlying innovation but instead empirically test for 
this very relationship.   
 
The paper builds on our previous work (Mazzucato and Semmler 1999; Mazzucato 
2002; 2003) where it is found that excess volatility and idiosyncratic risk are highest in 
periods of the industry life-cycle when innovation is the most ‘radical’.  However, while 
there we measured innovation at the industry level (e.g. through a quality index derived 
from hedonic prices), in the current paper we go a step further in linking innovation to 
volatility by using firm level patent data.  The productivity literature on market value and 
innovation has already established a positive relationship between a firm’s market value, 
its R&D intensity and its citation weighted patents (Griliches 1981; Pakes 1985; Hall 
1993, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005). Here we see whether this type of data can also 
help us better understand volatility dynamics which, as argued above, have not been 
studied in light of firm specific innovation dynamics.   
 
Both Frank Knight (1921) and John Maynard Keynes (1973), who distinguished ‘risk’ 
from ‘uncertainty’, used technological innovation as an example of true uncertainty which 
cannot be calculated via probabilities like risk2.  We start from the assumption that 
patents that are “more important” are those that are the most uncertain due to the way 
they challenge the status quo, more so at least than incremental innovations (Tushman 
and Anderson 1986).  We use citation weighted patents as a proxy for the ‘importance’ 
of an innovation and see whether firms with more ‘important’ innovations experience 
more volatility.  Specifically, we test for the relationship between firm level idiosyncratic 
risk and the following innovation variables: R&D intensity, patent counts, and patents 
weighted by their citations.  We also look at the impact of these variables on the level of 
price-earnings as this relationship lies at the core of the ‘rational bubble’ hypothesis 
where both the level and volatility of stock prices are related to the uncertainty regarding 
a firm’s average future profits (Pastor and Veronesi 2004; 2005).    
 
As in our previous work, we focus our study on one particular sector so that we can 
better relate stock price dynamics to the changing character and intensity of innovation 
over the industry life-cycle (Gort and Klepper 1982).  The biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries (from now on biotech and pharma) are particularly interesting 
to study in this regard due to their high rates of patenting and R&D intensity (providing 
us with ample innovation data to study), and due to the way that the search process for 
innovations has changed over the last half century (as documented in Gambardella 
[1995], Henderson et al. [1999]) — motivating us to also ask whether the relationship 
between innovation and volatility has co-evolved with such transformations.   
Our analysis is carried out in 3 stages.  We first see whether we can replicate the results 
found in the market value (Tobin’s q) and innovation literature (Griliches, 1981; Hall, 
                                            
1
 Of the above cited authors, Shiller (2000) comes closest to considering the impact of technology by looking 
at excess volatility during the course of technological revolutions. 
2
 “The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either from calculation a priori or from statistics 
of past experience). While in the case of uncertainty that is not true, the reason being in general that it is 
impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique…” 
(Knight, 1921, p. 232-233)     
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Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005 from now on HJT) using flow rather than stock variables 
(cumulative and depreciated), since in the case of volatility it is the latest ‘news’ that is 
relevant.  Second, we test for a statistical relationship between idiosyncratic risk and 
these innovation variables in order to explore the hypothesis that technology is the 
source of the increase in firm specific risk (as suggested but not tested in Campbell et al. 
[2001], and Shiller [2000]).  Third, we test the ‘rational bubble’ hypothesis in Pastor and 
Veronesi (2004) by exploring the relationship between the level of price-earnings (P/E) 
and the innovation variables, as well as the direct relationship between idiosyncratic risk 
and P/E.   
 
Our results provide preliminary evidence that there is indeed a positive and significant 
relationship between firm specific volatility and firm level innovation. We find that both 
idiosyncratic risk and the level of price earnings are significantly related to R&D intensity, 
and to the various patent related measures used in the analysis. We also find a positive 
relationship between these innovation measures and the level of price-earnings, as is 
predicted by the ‘rational bubble’ hypothesis.  We pay particular attention to the lag 
structure of the independent variables as this provides information on the speed at which 
the market reacts to news regarding innovation.  In this regard it appears that the lag on 
innovation outputs (patents) is lower than that on inputs (R&D), and also that the lags for 
biotech are lower than those in pharma, suggesting that the market reacts more quickly 
to innovation in newer segments of the sector.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
innovation and stock prices; Section 3 discusses the data used and the variables 
constructed; Section 4 provides descriptive statistics and a discussion of the model 
selection criteria; Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Innovation and Stock Prices (level vs. volatility): a quick review 
 
Uncertainty in finance models refers to how expectations about a firm’s future growth 
affects its market valuation (Campbell, Lo and McKinley 19973).  Both Knight (1921) and 
Keynes (1973) highlighted the way that technological innovation is an example of true 
uncertainty, which cannot be calculated via probabilities like risk.  Yet, even though a 
firm’s investment in technological change is a major determinant of its (potential) future 
growth, few finance models link stock price dynamics to innovation variables at the level 
of the firm and industry. The few studies that do relate stock price dynamics to 
innovation, do so mainly by linking changes in the stock price level to innovation, rather 
than linking changes in volatility of stock prices to innovation.  This is ironic given that it 
is especially the volatility of stock prices, more than their level, which should be related 
to ‘news’ on changes in technology.  In this section we review the literature that relates 
stock price dynamics to innovation, dividing it between those contributions that focus on 
the level of stock returns (2.1), and those that focus on the volatility of stock returns 
(2.2)—neither one using innovation data—and then our own contributions which have 
studied volatility dynamics using industry innovation data (2.3).  The rest of the paper is 
then dedicated to studying volatility dynamics using firm level innovation data.    
 
                                            
3
 “The starting point for any financial model is the uncertainty facing investors, and the substance of every 
financial model involves the impact of uncertainty on the behaviour of investors, and ultimately, on market 
prices.”  (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997) 
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2.1 Innovation and stock prices (level) 
 
Studies that link the level of stock prices to innovation come principally from the applied 
industrial economics literature which studies innovation and stock prices during the 
industry life-cycle (e.g. Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994; Jovanovic and Greenwood 
1999; Mazzucato and Semmler 1999) and the productivity literature on market value 
(Tobin’s q) and patents (e.g. Griliches 1981; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005 from now 
on HJT). 
 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) make predictions concerning the evolution of the 
average industry stock price level around the “shakeout” period of the industry life-cycle.  
They predict that just before the shakeout occurs the average stock price will fall 
because the new innovation precipitates a fall in product price which is bad news for 
incumbents.  Building on this work, Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) develop a model 
in which innovation causes new capital to destroy old capital (with a lag) and since it is 
primarily incumbents who are (initially) quoted on the stock market, innovations by new 
start-ups cause the stock market to decline immediately since rational investors with 
perfect foresight foresee the future damage to old capital.  In a study of the US auto 
industry (1899-1998), Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) also relate the dynamics of the 
average industry stock price to the dynamics of the industry ‘shakeout’. 
 
Another body of literature that connects stock prices to innovation is that on the 
relationship between a firm’s market value, its stock of R&D, and its stock of patents 
(Griliches 1981; Griliches, Hall and Pakes 1991; HJT 2005).  Using a Tobin’s q equation, 
this  literature tries to evaluate whether the market positively values the investment of a 
firm in technological change: if patent statistics contain information about shifts in 
technological opportunities, then they should be correlated with current changes in 
market value since market values are driven by the expectations about future growth.  
Given the skewed nature of the value of patents, Griliches, Hall and Pakes (2001) make 
use of patent citation data to distinguish important patents from less important ones. 
Using a Tobin-q equation, they find a significant relationship between citation-weighted 
patent stocks and the market value of firms where market value increases with citation 
intensity, at an increasing rate.  They find that while a reasonable fraction of the variance 
of market value can be explained by R&D spending and/or the stock of R&D, patents are 
informative above and beyond R&D only when weighted by citations (unweighted patent 
applications are far less significant).  The market premium associated with citations is 
found to be due mostly to the high valuation of the upper tail of cited patents (as 
opposed to a smoother increase in value as citation intensity increases)4.  A more recent 
study (HJT, 2005) finds further support for the relationship between knowledge assets 
and market value, highlighting differences between sectors: elasticity tests find that the 
marginal effect of additional citations per patent on market value is especially high in 
knowledge intensive industries such as the pharmaceutical industry. R&D stocks are 
more tightly correlated with market value than patents and patent citations stock is more 
significant than patents stock. 
 
 
                                            
4
 That is, after controlling for R&D and the unweighted stock of patents, they find no difference in value 
between firms whose patents have no citations, and those firms whose patent portfolio has approximately 
the median number of citations per patent.  There is, however, a significant increase in value associated with 
having above-median citation intensity, and a substantial value premium associated with having a citation 
intensity in the upper quartile of the distribution (HJT 2001). 
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2.2 Innovation and stock price volatility (with no innovation data) 
 
The few works that have looked at the relationship between innovation and the volatility 
of stock prices have done so mainly at the aggregate level, and without using innovation 
data.  Shiller’s work has shown that excess volatility is higher during periods of 
technological revolutions (Shiller 2000).  He claims that the efficient market model 
greatly underestimates stock price volatility due to the fact that it does not incorporate 
the social mechanism by which expectations are formed (i.e. animal spirits, herd 
behavior, bandwagon effects). In periods of technological revolutions, such effects are 
strongest due to the increased uncertainty regarding both technology and demand 
(causing investors to be less confident about their own judgments).  
 
Campbell et al. (2001) study the idiosyncratic versus systematic nature of volatility by 
decomposing the return of a typical stock into three components: the market wide return, 
the industry specific residual and a firm specific residual.  They use variance 
decomposition analysis to study the volatility of these components over time.  The firm 
specific residual is the idiosyncratic component of risk, while the market wide return 
captures the systematic component of risk.  They find that while aggregate market and 
industry variances have been stable (updating and confirming Schwert’s 1989 finding 
that market volatility did not increase in the period 1926-1997), firm level variance 
displays a large and significant positive trend, actually doubling between 1962 and1997.  
They claim that this increase is related to the impact of the IT revolution on various 
factors including the speed of information flows.  
 
Finally the work of Pastor and Veronesi (2005) provides interesting insights on the 
relationship between innovation, uncertainty and both the level and volatility of stock 
prices.  They claim that if one includes the effect of uncertainty about a firm’s average 
future profitability into market valuation models, then bubbles can be understood as 
emerging from rational, not irrational, behavior about future expected growth. Building on 
the result in Pastor and Veronesi (2004) that uncertainty about average productivity 
increases market value (because market value is convex in average productivity), they 
extend the model to explain why technological revolutions cause the stock prices of 
innovative firms to be more volatile and experience bubble like patterns.  The basic idea 
is that when a firm introduces a new technology, its stock price rises due to the 
expectations regarding the positive impact of the new technology on its productivity.  
Volatility also rises because risk is idiosyncratic when technology is used on a small 
scale.  But if/once the new technology gets adopted throughout the economy, then risk 
becomes systematic causing the stock price to fall and volatility to decrease.  This 
bubble like behavior is strongest for those technologies that are the most uncertain (and 
the most ‘radical’).   
 
2.3 Firm level innovation and stock price volatility (with innovation data) 
 
As none of the studies cited above (2.2) use innovation data, the relationship between 
innovation and volatility remains only a hypothesis. Our earlier work tests this hypothesis 
using firm and industry level innovation data. The fact that most shocks are idiosyncratic 
to the firm or plant makes this imperative (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992).  In a 
comparative study on the auto and computer industries, Mazzucato (2002) finds that 
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idiosyncratic risk and excess volatility (as measured in Shiller [1981]5) are highest 
precisely during the decades in the industry life-cycle in which innovation is the most 
radical6 and market shares the most unstable—the latter due to the ‘competence 
destroying’ effect of radical innovations on industry market structure (Tushman and 
Anderson 1986).  For this reason Mazzucato and Tancioni (2006) argue that both market 
share instability and stock price volatility are indices of competition that ‘capture’ well the 
dynamics of creative destruction (in the PC industry better than entry/exit rates).  
 
Mazzucato and Tancioni (2005) attempt to generalize the above finding by studying 
whether idiosyncratic risk is higher for those firms and industries that are more R&D 
intensive (and in general more innovative according to sectoral taxonomies of innovation 
found in Pavitt 1984, and Marsili 2001).  The study is first performed on 34 different 
industries using data on industry level stock prices and R&D intensity, and then on firm 
level panel data for 5 specific industries that span the highly innovative to low innovative 
horizon (biotech, pharma, computers, textiles and agriculture).  In the latter, firm-level 
idiosyncratic risk is regressed on  firm level R&D intensity, for 822 firms between 1974-
2003.  It is found that while it is not true that more innovative industries are on average 
more volatile than less innovative ones (echoing to some extent the finding in Campbell 
et al. 2001 that industry level risk has not increased), at the firm level a positive and 
significant relationship is found between idiosyncratic risk and R&D intensity.  
Interestingly, the relationship is stronger for the biotech industry and the textile industry 
than for pharma and computers.  This may be because investors react strongly to news 
on innovation by firms in uncertain new industries, such as biotech or nanotechnology 
(with high potential growth), as well as to innovative firms in relatively static non 
innovative industries (such as textiles) since the latter ‘stick out’ from the crowd.  Firms in 
innovative but mature industries, like pharma or computers, tend instead to provoke less 
of a reaction since innovation is common (with high average R&D intensity) but less 
radical and uncertain due to the particular stage of the industry in its life-cycle.    
 
In the remaining sections of the paper, rather than using indirect or input measures of 
innovation, we use firm level patent citation data (as in the studies reviewed above by 
Pakes 1985 and HJT 2001;2005).  Our aim is to see whether the degree of excess 
volatility of returns and thus the dynamics of idiosyncratic risk are indeed positively 
correlated with more “important” innovations as is implied in the works cited above.  We 
also explore the relationship between radical innovation and the level of stock returns, as 
is implied (but not tested) in the work by Pastor and Veronesi (2004; 2005). Before 
discussing the details of the models we review the data, and in particular various issues 
related to patent citation data.  
                                            
5
 In Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) and Mazzucato (2002), “excess volatility” is measured as in Shiller 
(1981), i.e. the difference between the standard deviation of actual stock prices (vt) and efficient market 
prices (v*t):  
*
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* γ   where *
tv is the ex-post rational or perfect-
foresight price, ktD + is the dividend stream, jt+γ is a real discount factor equal to )1/(1 jtr ++ , and jtr + is 
the short (one-period) rate of discount at time t+j. 
6
 Innovation is measured here using quality change data derived, as in Filson (2001), by dividing hedonic 
prices by actual BEA prices. Hedonic prices are from Raff and Trajtenberg (1997, for autos), and Berndt and 
Rappaport (2000, for computers). In the case of autos, the analysis is supported by the use of an innovation 
survey by Abernathy et al. (1983) which ranks all innovations in the auto industry between 1890 and 1982 in 
terms of the degree to which the innovations altered products and processes.  
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3. Data and constructed variables 
 
3.1 Data  
 
We study the pharma and biotech industries from 1975 to 1999.  Our sample of firms is 
constructed by merging financial data from S&P (purchased from S&P Custom data 
dept) and USPTO patent data (extracted from the NBER patent citation database 
included in the book/CD by Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002).  The NBER patent citations 
database provides detailed patent related information on 3 million US patents granted 
between January 1963 and December 1999, and all citations made to these patents 
between 1975 and 1999 (over 16 million).  For each patent, information on the citations it 
received (a forward looking measure, which captures the relationship between a patent 
and subsequent technological developments that build up on it, i.e. its descendants), 
and the citations made (a backward looking measure which captures the relationship 
between a patent and the body of knowledge that preceded it, i.e. its antecedents). 
Weighting patents by citations is important since studies have found that the distribution 
of the value of patents is highly skewed, with few patents of very high value, and many 
of low value (a large fraction of the value of the stream of innovations is associated with 
a small number of very important innovations, Scherer, 1965).  There is also information 
on the number of claims, which is often recognized as an indicator of the wideness of the 
patent.  Although in our future work we plan to take into account various indices 
constructed using citations (e.g. the level of generality or originality of an innovation)7, in 
the current work we use only the number of patents for each firm and the number of 
citations received per patent.  
 
We have S&P financial data for 323 pharma firms and 563 biotech firms quoted on the 
stock market between 1950 and 2003.  We use the firm CUSIP code to match firms in 
the two data bases.  Only firms pertaining to the GIC codes (which in 2000 replaced the 
SIC codes), 352010 for biotech and 352020 for pharma are included in the analysis.  To 
merge the two databases, we use the patent application date rather than the patent 
granted date since the latter is subject to idiosyncratic changes in the speed of the 
patent review process (however it is only patents granted that are in the database).  The 
merging of the two databases results in a restricted sample: out of a total of 323 
pharmaceutical firms and 563 biotech firms in the S&P database, the merged sample 
contains 126 pharma firms and 177 biotech firms.  In order to avoid dealing with highly 
volatile stock price data, we have omitted firms present in sample for less than eight 
years. Since we consider a three-year maximum lag in our estimates, this guarantees 
that data is available for at least five years.  We thus end up with 63 firms in the pharma 
industry and 71 firms in the biotech industry8. When we work with the larger number of 
firms (126 and 177 firms in pharma and biotech) the results are not qualitatively different, 
but less significant.  Details on the number of observations employed in the estimates 
and on the sectional dimension are reported in the tables.    
                                            
7
 For example, the degree to which an innovation is ‘general’ or ‘original’ can be measured using indices 
which use citations received and citations made data along with data on particular technological fields. A 
patent which is very general is one which has received citations from other patents in a wide variety of fields.  
A patent which is instead highly original is one which makes citations to other patents in a limited set of 
technological fields.  Inserting this information in our future work will allow us to see whether the market 
places more/less value on certain types of innovations than others.   
8
 Other sample selection criteria have been used in the literature. For example, in a related study on spill-
overs and market value, Deng (2005) omits firms with less than 3 years in the Compustat database.  
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Figure 1 indicates that the number of firms rose steadily in both industries, slowing down 
in the early 90s for pharma, and in the late 90s for biotech. A look at the herfindahl index 
shows that in both industries, the rise in firms was accompanied by a fall in 
concentration. To deal with unbalanced sample panel estimations, we employ standard 
correction techniques to control for the presence of missing data in some periods.   
 
We use the following firm level variables from the S&P database: stock price (P), 
dividends (D), revenues (Rev), price-earnings ratio (P/E), market value (MKTV), and 
R&D. We also use the average S&P500 value for all these financial variables9.  The 
following innovation variables are used from the patent database: the annual number of 
patent applications (PAT); patents weighted by citations received (PATW); and patents 
per R&D, or the patent yield which captures the efficiency of R&D (PATY). We also 
explore the use of citations made (i.e. backward citations) but find this measure to be 
less significant than citations received so use only the latter in the final analysis.  
 
The financial variables are monthly; R&D is quarterly; and patents are annual10.  
Following Schwert (1989), the monthly S&P data is used to calculate the volatility of 
annual returns (the standard deviation is calculated over 12 month observations on 
returns).  We use monthly financial data, rather than daily data, since it would be 
exaggerated to expect that quarterly R&D figures and annual patent data have an impact 
on daily stock prices.  Furthermore, Campbell et al (2001) analyze volatility using both 
daily and monthly data and do not find qualitative differences (in trends).  
 
To measure idiosyncratic risk we do not use the variance decomposition method used in 
Campbell et al. (2001) which isolates firm, industry and market level volatility through a 
variance decomposition analysis.  Rather, we use a proxy for idiosyncratic risk (IR) 
which captures the degree to which firm specific returns are more volatile than market 
level returns: the log ratio between the standard deviation of a firm’s return11 and the 
standard deviation of the average industry return (the standard deviation of the S&P500 
return for the specific industry  to which the firm belongs).  When considering the whole 
sample of 134 firms in our analysis, we also control for (fixed) industry effects with an 
industry dummy (for biotech).   
 
The R&D and patent variables are entered in terms of flows rather than stocks.  This lies 
in contrast to the market value and innovation literature (HJT 2005), which instead uses 
stocks (defined applying a Permanent Inventory approach with a 15% depreciation 
assumption).  We use flow variables because while it makes sense to think that it is the 
stock of intangible assets that affects the level of market value, changes in stock prices 
(hence their volatility) are affected mainly by recent ‘news’ that the market did not 
previously take into account (flows not stocks).  Since we are mainly concerned with the 
determinants of IR (which is stationary in mean over time), the use of cumulative and 
thus trended variables such as stocks would render the estimations unbalanced (from 
the point of view of the statistical properties of the data) and thus potentially distorted.  
Furthermore, in a study by Hall (1993), where R&D is entered both as a stock and as a 
                                            
9
 On average, nearly 95% and 97% of the merged sample is available when financial variables are matched 
with, respectively, R&D intensity and patents weighted by citations received.  
 
10
 The patent application date is listed by year, while patent grant date is listed by month.  
11
 The return of a firm’s stock is defined as: 
( )
1
1
−
− +−
t
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P
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.   
INNOGEN Working Paper 64                                                                  July 2008 
 
Mariana Mazzucato and Massimiliano Tancioni 
 
11 
flow in the market value equation, it is found that the flow variable has more explanatory 
power than the stock “…which implies a higher valuation on recent R&D than on the 
history of R&D spending.” (Hall 1993, p. 261)12.    
 
3.2 Truncation and other data issues 
 
Patents citation data are naturally susceptible to two types of truncation problems.  One 
has to do with the patent counts and the other one with the citation counts13.  The former 
arises from the fact that as the end date is approached, only a percentage of the patents 
that have been applied for (and are later granted) are available in the data. The second 
truncation problem regards citation counts. As the NBER data ends in 1999, we have no 
information on the citations received by patents in the database beyond this period. 
Although this affects all the patents in the database (patents keep receiving citations 
over long periods, even beyond 50 years), it is especially serious for patents close to the 
end date.  Since every year suffers a different degree of this problem (with the later 
years suffering more), it makes comparison between years difficult.   
 
There are two main ways to deal with both these truncation problems  The first is the 
fixed effects approach, the second is the structural approach (both reviewed in detail in 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002, Ch. 13).  The fixed effects approach involves scaling citation 
counts by dividing them by the total citation count for a group of patents to which the 
patent of interest belongs (e.g. by period, or by field).  In essence, this means calculating 
the firm’s share of total industry patents14.  The quasi structural approach is a more 
involved approach based on estimating the shape of the citation lag distribution, i.e. the 
fraction of lifetime citations (defined as 30 years after the grant date) that are received in 
each year after the patent is granted (HJT 2005)15.  Unlike the fixed effects approach it 
allows one to distinguish real from artefactual differences between years and fields. For 
example, one can see whether the patents issued in the late 1990’s made fewer 
citations, after controlling for the size and fertility of the stock of patents to be cited, than 
those before. By doing this, one can get the “real” 1975 patents, just as with CPI 
adjustments.  
                                            
12
 Hall (1993) notes that the significance of the R&D flow is reduced when cash flow is included as a 
regressor suggesting that at least part of the R&D flow effect arises from its correlation with cash flow. In 
contrast, the R&D stock variable is not sensitive to the inclusion of the cash flow variable.  We test for this 
below and find that the cash flow variable is less significant than it is in Hall (1993).  
 
13
 Another problem regarding citations is that since the propensity to cite is not constant, it is important to 
distinguish when an increase in the number of citations (e.g. technological impact of the patent) is “real” as 
opposed to “artefactual”. The latter includes the possibility that in some periods there was “citation inflation”, 
e.g. due to institutional factors (e.g. USPTO practices) and/or differences across fields. 
 
14
 To remove year and/or field effects, the number of citations received by a given patent are divided by the 
corresponding year-field mean, or only by yearly means to remove only year effects.  The justification for the 
correction is to remove factors of time variability that are not related to substantial innovation, as in the case 
of legislative interventions which affect number of patents and citations (e.g. the Bayh-Dole act), or by the 
truncation issue.  The problem with this method is that it does not distinguish between differences that are 
real and those that are artefactual (e.g. if patents in the 1990’s really did have more technological impact, 
removing the year effects ignores this real factor.).   
 
15
 Given the distribution, which is assumed stationary and independent of the overall citation intensity, the 
authors estimate the total citations of any patent for which a portion of its citation life is observed. This is 
done by dividing the observed citations by the fraction of the population that lies in the time interval for which 
citations are observed (HJT, 2005, p. 13) 
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We follow a slightly modified version of the fixed effects approach.  We divide the firm-
level data by the average industry citations not the total, since the latter varies with the 
changing number of firms in our unbalanced sample. That is, since the number of firms 
that are present in the sample increases over time16 (as evident in Figure 1), while the 
innovative activity at the firm-level remains relatively stable, the standard fixed effects 
correction would bias downward the measure of innovation17.  Dividing by the yearly 
average (as opposed to the yearly total), means that the correction is not affected by the 
changing number of firms in the sample18.  
 
Lastly, another way we confront the truncation problem is to test our results on two 
samples. One sample which ends in 1999, i.e. the last year included in the NBER patent 
citation database, and another sample which ends in 1995, before the truncation 
problem becomes serious.  This strategy, which is also followed in HJT (2005), is a 
crude way of getting rid of the most problematic (later) years referred to above and an 
admission that all the truncation adjustments don’t totally solve the problem.   
 
3.3 The pharma-biotech sector 
 
As in our previous work on stock price volatility (Mazzucato and Semmler 1999; 
Mazzucato 2002; 2003), we focus on a single sector so to better take into account the 
possible effect of qualitative and quantitative changes in innovation over the industry life-
cycle (not possible in more static cross-section industry studies).  We focus on the 
pharma and biotech industries due to the fact that the high R&D and patenting intensity 
of these industries provides us with ample innovation data, and also because much has 
been written about changes in innovation dynamics in this sector, allowing us to test 
whether the relationships we study have evolved alongside such transformations. For 
example, Henderson et al. (1999) describe the changes that have taken place since the 
mid 1980’s in the innovative division of labor between large pharma firms and small 
(dedicated) biotech firms.  Similarly, Gambardella (1995) describes how advances in 
science (enzymology, genetics and computational ability) since the 1980’s caused a 
change in the way that firms search for new innovations: a pre 1980 period of "random 
screening",  and a post-1980 period of “guided screening” characterized by more scale 
economies and path-dependency19.  An important institutional event which affected 
patenting behavior in this period was the 1980 Bayh-Dole act which allowed universities 
                                            
16
The number of firms that are contemporaneously present in the whole sample goes from 31 in 1980 to 187 
in 2003, while the average number of patent applications per firm is (only) doubled in the same period. 
 
17
 Furthermore, the FE approach suggested in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) removes the time series 
variability, since the evolution of innovative intensity over time is substantially extracted by the correction. 
 
18
 An example: in 1970, Abbot Technologies has 7 patents, that receive a total of 40 citations, and in the 
entire pharmaceutical industry there are 20 firms, with 107 patents which have 792 citations.  This means 
that we need to first divide 40 by 7 to get the numerator. However, since we don’t want to eliminate the data 
on patents that receive no citations (to distinguish them from those firms that have no patents at all) we add 
1 to each citation figure so that it is 41 divided by 7, equal to 5.85. Then to adjust for the two types of 
truncation problems we divide 5.85 by the total number of citations in the industry (+1), divided by the 
average number of patents in the industry which is 793/107, divided then by the number of firms, 20 = .370.  
So the figure in 1970 for Abbot Technologies is 15.81.    
 
19
 Gambardella (1995) documents that although the guided regime did not increase the number of new 
molecules discovered, it did decrease the failure rate of those tested (hence making the process more 
efficient).   
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and small businesses to patent discoveries emanating from publicly sponsored research 
(e.g. by the NIH), prompting many biotech spin-offs from academia.   
 
As many patents in the pharma industry do not result in new drugs (Harris, 2002; Pisano 
2006) 20, we do not assume that patents represent actual innovations (e.g. a new drug), 
but rather signals that the market receives regarding the potential ‘innovativeness’ of a 
firm.  The more patents a firm has the stronger the signal regarding its potential 
innovativeness, and the more citations per patent, the more important (trustworthy) the 
signal.  This lies in contrast with the usual interpretation of R&D as an input and patents 
as an output of the innovation process.  In fact, it might be that because there are so 
many patents in this industry (inflated especially after the 1980 Bayh-Dole act), the 
market treats them as more noisy signals than in other industries, and hence citations 
take on an even more important role as a filtering device.  The biotech part of the sector 
is in an earlier phase of its life-cycle than pharma, and in some respects more innovative 
(since biotech firms are more focused on research, and less on marketing and 
distribution, than pharma firms), hence it is interesting to see whether in biotech, patents 
are treated as stronger signals of potential innovations than in pharma.  It is also 
interesting to see whether the fact that biotech firms are more focused on single 
research projects, hence less diversified in their research portfolio, produces more 
volatility.   In general, the role of biotech in the innovative division of labor (Henderson et 
al. 1999), affects the degree to which patents act as signals in the sector, the speed of 
the market’s reaction to such ‘news’, and the perceived risk.  
 
To understand the uncertainty around patents as signals of innovativeness it is important 
to remember that we merged the databases using the patent application date (rather 
than the patent granted date) when there is the highest uncertainty: uncertainty whether 
the patent will be granted, uncertainty whether, even if it is granted, the patent will be 
successful, etc.  And as the approximate lag between the application date and the 
granted date is 3 years, when considering the lag structure of the models below,  a lag of  
t-1 on patent applications is like a forward lag of t+2 for patents granted.  
 
4. Descriptive statistics and model selection 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the different variables used in the study for the 
(a) full sample, (b) for pharma only, and (c) for biotech only21. The Table contains first 
the information for the three financial variables (market value, price-earnings, 
idiosyncratic risk) and then for the innovation variables, including the productivity of 
R&D, i.e. the patent yield’ (PAT/R&D) used in HJT (2005). 
 
The average number of patent applications (PAT) per firm is 8.3 (9.5 for pharma and 
nearly 4 for biotech), with large variability in both industries (standard deviations are 17.5 
and 18.4 respectively). Employing a standardized measure of variability (coefficient of 
                                            
 
20
 Pisano (2006) reports that it takes an average of 10-12 years for a company to get a drug out on the 
market. 
Only 10%-20% of drug candidates beginning clinical trials have been approved by the FDA. 
 
21
 For descriptive purposes, we do not impose the minimum presence condition at this stage. This because 
our aim is to give a more comprehensive summary of the data structure. 
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variation), we observe that patenting activity is more heterogeneous amongst the biotech 
firms than the pharma firms.  In the case of weighted patents (PATW), both the sample 
mean and the standard deviation are much higher for the biotech industry—indicating 
that although there are more patents in pharma, they are on average more ‘important’ in 
biotech.  Sample means and standard deviations of R&D intensity are much higher in 
pharma than biotech (though as is well known, what is counted as R&D in pharma, 
sometimes also includes marketing type activities).  The skewness measure indicates a 
high degree of asymmetry (long right tails) for all the innovation variables, with R&D 
more skewed in pharma than biotech, but patenting more skewed in biotech than 
pharma. The Kurtosis measure indicates that the distributions (in both samples) are also 
leptokurtic compared to the normal.   
 
With regards to the financial variables, the level of market value and the level of price 
earnings (MKTVAL and P/E) exhibit a large amount of variation, while idiosyncratic risk 
(IR) appears more concentrated around a normal distribution. They result all positively 
skewed and leptokurtic, with the distribution of IR being closer to the normal.  The 
average P/E for biotech is three times that in pharma, as would be expected given the 
smaller average size of biotech firms, the fact that they often have low earnings (Pisano 
2006), and their higher innovativeness (evidenced by their higher patent yield) hence 
higher expected growth.   
 
 Contemporaneous correlations between the variables don’t show much significance. 
This evidence is supported by the regression results (below) which show that the 
relationships hold mostly dynamically and, in particular, that patents are correlated with 
lagged R&D intensity.  Even if we do not perform dynamic correlations, we can obtain a 
visual appreciation of the relationships by plotting different variables together over time. 
From Figure 2a and 2b, idiosyncratic risk appears remarkably correlated with both R&D 
intensity and, to a lesser extent in the biotech industry, to citation weighted patents. 
These figures provide a first, albeit simplistic, indication of the co-evolution of 
idiosyncratic risk and innovation—investigated more rigorously below.  
It is interesting to see that in Figure 3 the rise in citation weighted patents is 
accompanied in both pharma and biotech (but more so for biotech) by a rise in market 
share instability22.  This is precisely what would be expected by the literature on 
‘competence-destroying’ innovations (Tushman and Anderson 1986) and gives us a 
preliminary reason to expect that citation weighted patents also affect the volatility of 
stock prices (as these are affected by the expected future market share of a firm).  This 
result in fact confirms that found in Mazzucato (2002): market share instability is highest 
in periods of the industry life-cycle when innovation is the most ‘radical’ or competence 
destroying (discussed in 2.3).    
 
4.2 Model selection 
 
In the remaining sections, we test the relationship between the innovation variables 
discussed above and the level and volatility of stock returns (all the variables are entered 
in logs).  We first try to replicate the results found in HJT (2005) regarding the 
relationship between market value, R&D, and patents (Model 1). Second, we regress 
                                            
22
 The market share instability index is defined in Hymer and Pashigian (1962): |][| 1,
1
−
=
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n
i
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where s=market share of firm i, and n=number of firms.  
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idiosyncratic risk on the innovation variables to test whether firm specific risk is related to 
innovation, as hypothesized (but not tested) in Campbell et al. (2001) (Model 2). Third, 
we test the relationship between innovation and the level and volatility of stock prices 
found in the “rational bubble” hypothesis (Pastor and Veronesi, 2004), by regressing the 
P/E ratio on idiosyncratic risk (IR) (Model 3) and then directly on the innovation variables 
(Model 4).    
 
Specifically, the relationships we estimate are:  
 
Model 1   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tiiltiiti uMKTVAL ,,,log εα +++= −x  
 
Model 2 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tiiltiiti uIDRISK ,,,log εα +++= −x   
 
Model 3 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) tiiltiiti uIDRISKEP ,,, log/log εβα +++= −  
 
 
Model 4 
 
4a.  ( ) ( ) ( ) tiiltiiti uEP ,,,/log εα +++= −x  
where ti,x  is a vector of contemporaneous and lagged regressors representing different 
innovation variables. Specifically, 
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The lag structure is chosen on the basis of likelihood ratio tests. The alpha subscript i in 
brackets and the ( )iu  error factor are entered as we allow, alternatively, for fixed and 
random effects. In the pooled panel model case such sectional controls are removed.   
 
In each estimation we include a control for firm size: a firm’s market share (firm revenues 
divided by industry revenues) or, alternatively, the share of a firm’s capitalization 
compared to the industry capitalization. As the former is found to be more significant 
than the latter, we report results in the tables only with market share as the firm size 
control. Controlling for firm size is important due to the fact that small firms tend to be 
more volatile than large firms (in both growth rates and stock prices).  Two dummies are 
also used to control for various aspects of the innovation dynamics discussed in 3.2:  a 
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period dummy to test whether the relationships are stronger/weaker in one of the two 
innovation regimes (pre/post 1985); and, when employing the whole sample, an industry 
dummy to see whether the dynamics differ in biotech, the relatively newer segment of 
the industry23.  
 
The panel structure of the data-set suggests to employ as natural model alternatives the 
pooled, the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random Effects (RE) specifications.  With the FE 
model (alpha subscript i in equations above) firm level factors systematically enter the 
relationships, while in the RE model (the error component ( )iu  in equations above) these 
factors are distributed randomly, i.e. they are an error component which is constant over 
time. The FE model thus presumes that there are omitted variables that have section-
specific effects, such as tacit knowledge and related managerial capabilities.  HJT (2005) 
adopt a pooled model with period and industry dummies. Aside from the fact that their 
significant results (between market value and innovation) disappear when FE are used 
(as also in the related literature), they do not include FE for two reasons.  First on the 
grounds that since R&D stocks change slowly over time (by construction), the inclusion 
of FEs would capture those systematic components that are deemed related to firm 
specific R&D strategies, i.e. to the independent variable. Second, on the grounds that 
since firms change their strategies over time in response to market signals, the FE 
model is inappropriate as it presumes permanent firm specific effects.   
 
In our case, the first point is irrelevant since we are dealing with volatile flow data and 
not with slowly-changing stocks, hence FEs are not likely to be excessively correlated 
with the independent variable and thus to capture the sample correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables. Concerning the second point, we believe that 
even if firm strategies vary in response to time-varying market signals, the presence of 
publicly available information on fundamentals (that are likely to be relatively firm-
specific) may result in systematic cross-sectional factors, reflecting relatively permanent 
aspects of the firm’s fundamentals that are not explicitly taken into account in the model 
specification24. 
 
For these reasons, unlike HJT (2005), we do not impose any particular model 
specification and base our choices on statistical information only. The model selection 
procedure is implemented in two steps, first evaluating the statistical relevance of the 
individual (firm) effects and then whether they are correlated with the regressors. This is 
done by testing, via the Breusch-Pagan LM test, for the presence of individual effects 
against the common constant model (pooled estimator), and then testing the null of 
orthogonality of the individual effects, i.e. the RE specification, assuming a FE as 
alternative hypothesis. In this second step the reference evaluation tool is the Hausman 
test. 
                                            
23
 In each model, we also test a version of equation (c) that includes the patent yield variable (PATY), but we 
don’t report on the results for this variable as it emerges as not significant in all the estimates. 
 
24
 We don’t think there is an objective reason to believe that firm specific effects are fixed over time and 
randomly distributed over the sample, as implied in the RE specification. Moreover, the RE model presumes 
that the section specific effects and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated. This assumption is 
questionable, since it is likely that the omitted factors that are relevant for the dependent variable are also 
relevant in determining the explanatory variable (Mundlack, 1978). As regards our specific analysis, the 
omitted factors no doubt include tacit knowledge and managerial capabilities, factors that have relevant 
effects on both innovative activity and the market performance of a given firm. 
 
INNOGEN Working Paper 64                                                                  July 2008 
 
Mariana Mazzucato and Massimiliano Tancioni 
 
17 
The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of the pooled model (common 
constant) for nearly the entire set of specifications. A pooled model is selected only for 
Models 2a, 2b and 2c  when employing the biotech sample. In all the other cases, the 
Breusch-Pagan test indicates a RE specification.  According to the Hausman test, a RE 
model is selected for Models 2 (a, b, c) and 4 (a, b, c) when employing the whole sample 
and Models 4 (a, b, c) when employing the pharma sample.  In all the other cases a FE 
specification is selected. The model selection results are presented in detail in tables 2a, 
2b and 2c (respectively for the whole, pharma and biotech samples) and summarized in 
column 1 of Tables 3-4-5.   
 
In order to check the robustness of results to different model formulations, we have re-
estimated the same relationships above by imposing, irrespective of the indications of 
model selection tests, a common Pooled, RE and FE structure. The estimates have 
shown that results change significantly when section-specific effects are imposed in an 
otherwise selected pooled model (thus for equations 2a, 2b and 2c in the Biotech 
sample), while they do not change dramatically when imposing a FE (RE) model to a RE 
(FE) selected model (except for the estimates that resulted only marginally significant in 
the selected model estimates).  
 
These outcomes signal that, even if the inclusion of firm-specific controls is relevant for 
our results, the way section (firm-level) specificities are modelled (fixed versus random 
effects) does not appear particularly relevant. Table 6 in the appendix summarizes the 
results of the robustness checks focussing on the final specifications (models 1c, 2c, 3 
and 4c) for the whole sample.  
 
5. Results     
 
The results of the preferred models are summarized in Table 3 for the whole sample and 
Tables 4-5 for the pharma and biotech samples.  Concerning robustness, our estimates 
are substantially unchanged when employing the reduced sample with end date fixed at 
1995 in the place of 1999 (as done also in HJT 2005).  This suggests that our correction 
for the truncation problem, using the modified fixed effects approach discussed above, 
was efficient. Moreover, the estimation results are qualitatively robust to different 
calibrations of the minimum presence criterion25.  
 
According to the F tests (Pooled and FE model specifications) and Wald tests (RE model 
specifications), the models are all globally significant with the unique exception of Model 
2a and, marginally, of Model 2b, when employing the biotech sample. The regression is 
thus statistically insignificant when only a standard measure of innovation input is 
entered R&D), while it turns out significant when augmented with patents and in 
particular weighted patents. 
 
Adjusted R-sq (Pooled model) and overall R-sq statistics (FE and RE specifications) 
signal an acceptable measure of fit for Model 126 and, with the exception of the biotech 
                                            
25
 We have repeated the estimates by selecting a minimum presence condition spanning from three to ten 
years, obtaining qualitatively constant estimates. Even employing no selection at all, the estimates remain 
relatively significant in nearly all models. The main differences are, in this case, a moderate loss of statistical 
significance, in particular for Models 3 and 4 in the case of the biotech sample. 
 
26
 In Model 1, the average measure of fit, spans from nearly 24% for the whole sample estimates, to 40% for 
the pharma sample and 37% for the biotech sample. 
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sector, for Models 3 and 427. The measure of fit is instead weak for Model 2, particularly 
when employing the biotech sample28. It is interesting to note that, when employing the 
whole and the pharma samples the measure of fit improves moving from Model 3 to 
Model 4. This happens irrespective of the specific version of Model 4 (a, b or c), 
signaling that direct measures of innovation outperform our measure of uncertainty 
(IDRISK) in explaining the variability of the P/E ratio. 
 
Concerning the dynamic specification of the models, best estimates are obtained with 
lagged regressors in all the models. Moreover, by nesting the selected dynamic 
structures of Models 2 to 4, we can infer that innovation precedes idiosyncratic risk in the 
dynamic correlations with the P/E ratio. If we consider the whole sample, from Model 3 
we obtain a lag 1 for IDRISK, while for Model 4 we select a lag 3 for RD/REV and a lag 2 
for PAT-PATW. This result is consistent with the selection of a lag 2 and 1 (respectively 
for RD/REV and PAT-PATW in Model 2, and it is an indication of the validity of our 
theoretical hypothesis. In this respect, consistent result are obtained also for the pharma 
and biotech estimates, i.e. the dynamics of the P/E ratio depends on lagged uncertainty, 
which in turn depends on lagged measures of innovation, with innovation preceding 
idiosyncratic risk. 
 
When the estimations are done employing the FE model, the introduction of the biotech 
industry dummy (in the case of the whole sample) does not make sense.  Hence, in the 
case of FE model estimates the industry dummy estimates are not present. Yet,  by 
imposing a RE model specification irrespective of the indications of the Hausman test 
and maintaining the industry control, we find that the sign and significance of the biotech 
dummy is always significant, with a negative sign in model 1 (i.e. biotech firms have on 
average 10% less market value than the sample mean), a positive sign in Model 2 
(biotech firms experience on average 30-35% more idiosyncratic risk than the sample 
mean), and a positive effect in Models 3 and 4 (biotech firms have on average 35% 
higher P/E than the sample mean). Considering the final estimates reported in Table 3, 
for RE Models 2 and 4, the dimension of the industry specificity can be derived by 
comparing the estimated value of the biotech dummy with that of the constant term. The 
biotech industry dummy is always positive and significant. 
 
  The inclusion of the post 1985 period dummy resulted statistically significant for Models 
2, 3 and 4 (spec. a, b and c) in the whole sample, in Models 2a, 1, 3 and 4 (all specs) in 
the pharma sample and in Model 1 (all specs) signaling the possibility of a structural 
break in the dynamics of volatility after 1985, i.e. that there is more firm specific volatility 
in the second period, a result confirmed in the work of Campbell et al. (2001). We plan to 
study this phenomenon more in our future work, trying to link it to changes in the search 
(innovation) regimes discussed in Gambardella (1995) and elsewhere.  
 
Column 5 in Tables 3 and 4 shows that the sign for the control of firm size (market 
share) is as expected:  firm size has a positive effect on the level of market value, but a 
negative effect on volatility and the price-earnings ratio.  That small firms experience 
more volatility, in both growth and stock prices, is a well known phenomenon.  The fact 
                                                                                                                                  
 
27
 For Model 3 the average fit spans respectively nearly 11%, 18% and 4%. For Model 4 they are, 
respectively, nearly 25%, 22% and 2%. 
 
28
 The fit in this case is, on average, nearly 5% for the whole and pharma samples and 1% for the biotech 
sample. 
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that small firms also have high price-earnings is easier to interpret for highly innovative 
firms who have low earnings but high potential growth. It is less easy to interpret for 
those small firms that are not particularly innovative, but we cannot look into this unless 
we put their innovativeness as the dependent variable (something we may explore in our 
future work).  The use of the firm’s capitalization share as the control for firm size instead 
results statistically insignificant in Models 3-4 for the whole sample, in Models 2-3 for the 
pharma sample and in Model 4 for the biotech sample. It is interesting to highlight that, 
with the exception of Model 3 for the biotech sample, the control for firm size is never 
significant when employing the FE estimator, signaling that this effect is relatively stable 
over time and captured by the firm specific dummies (its presence does not alter the 
qualitative and quantitative results of the estimates).   
In what follows we review the results from Models 1-4, commenting only on the effect 
that the various innovation variables have on market share, idiosyncratic risk and price-
earnings.   
 
Model 1: Market value and innovation  
 
 Whole sample estimation results for Model 1 illustrate that R&D intensity, patent counts, 
and weighted patents have a positive and significant effect (each at the 1% level) on the 
level of market value.  It is interesting that positive results arise even when using flow 
data, instead of the usual stock measures used in the market value and innovation 
literature (HJT 2005).  Furthermore, the introduction of the simple patent count does not 
lead to a statistically insignificant R&D intensity coefficient, as it does when using stock 
measures.    
 
When the patent count variable is entered in 1b, the R&D intensity coefficient is slightly 
reduced in size, signaling that there is a certain degree of correlation between R&D 
intensity lagged 2 years and patent applications lagged 1 year.  When we run the 
pharma and biotech samples separately, PAT and PATW remain significant at the 1% 
level, while the reduction in the size of the coefficient for R&D intensity is stronger. In 
particular, in Models 1b and 1c estimated over the biotech sample the R&D intensity 
coefficient turns out insignificant, signaling the presence of a higher correlation between 
PAT and R&D intensity in this part of the industry (not surprising given the higher mean 
patent yield in biotech).   The preferred lag for R&D intensity is 3 in the pharma and 2 in 
the biotech sample, while the preferred lag for patents is 1 in the pharma sample and 2 
in the biotech sample29. These results suggest that the market reacts quicker to news on 
patents than to news on R&D, most probably due to its understanding of the lengthy 
process of research in this industry (Pisano 2006).   
 
When patents are weighted by citations received (1c) the estimated coefficients are 
smaller in size (due to the augmented average dimension induced by the weights) while 
their statistical significance is maintained, irrespective of the specific sample being 
considered.  When employing patents weighted by citations made, rather than received, 
the R&D intensity coefficient resulted weaker in both size and statistical terms.  In sum, 
the fit for Model 1 is consistent with the result of HJT [2005], even if it does not improve 
when patents are weighted by citations received (as it does in that study). The 
introduction of the patent yield variable proved insignificant.  
                                            
29
 To better investigate this dynamic relationship, we have regressed patent applications on different lags of 
R&D intensity. The best fit is obtained when the explanatory variable is entered with 2 lags in the whole and 
in the pharma samples and contemporaneously in the biotech sample. 
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Model 2: Idiosyncratic risk and innovation  
 
In Model 2 we evaluate the hypothesis that idiosyncratic risk is related to firm level 
innovation, as proxied by R&D intensity, patents and weighted patents.  Considering the 
whole sample estimates, we find that the innovation variables are significant, but less so 
here than in Model 1.  R&D intensity is always significant at the 5% level, even when 
patent measures are included as well.  Patent counts are significant at the 5% level, 
while weighted patents are significant at the 1% level.  Thus unlike market value in 
Model 1, it appears that volatility reacts more strongly to citation weighted patents (i.e. 
more important patents) than simple patent counts.  
 
As in Model 1 the lag on R&D is higher than that on patents (2 and 1 years respectively), 
in line with the results from Model 1.  The lags we find seem reasonable as they suggest 
that R&D investment takes more time than patents to have an effect on volatility. As in 
Model 1, the patent yield is insignificant.  
 
When we ran the pharma and biotech samples separately, we found that in the case of 
pharma the significance of R&D intensity rose (to the 1% level), while the significance of 
patents and weighted patents remained unchanged (respectively, at the 5% and 1% 
levels).  The patent yield resulted insignificant again.  The lag on R&D intensity for 
pharma is lower (1 lag) than that obtained in the combined sample (2 lags), suggesting 
that the market takes less time to react in this older segment of the industry (perhaps 
because it observes it less intensely through specialized market analysts who are more 
focused on new emerging sectors, like biotech and nanotechnology). The fact that we 
select the same lag structure for innovation input and output measures might signal that 
the market foresees the patent application given the spending on R&D that has already 
occurred (a hypothesis we are currently investigating further).  In the case of the biotech 
sample, R&D intensity is insignificant irrespective of the specification being considered, 
while PAT and PATW remain significant, respectively at the 5 and 1% levels.   
 
Model 3: Price-earnings ratios and idiosyncratic risk (rational bubble) 
 
Pastor and Veronesi (2004) claim that if one includes the uncertainty about a firm’s 
average future profitability into market valuation models, then bubbles can be 
understood as emerging from rational behavior about expected future profitability30.  As 
discussed above, this model predicts a positive relationship between the level and 
volatility of stock returns, both increasing when new technologies first emerge, then 
falling when the uncertainty around the technologies decreases. With Models 3 and 4 we 
evaluate these hypotheses empirically: we first regress price-earnings on idiosyncratic 
risk (Model 3), and then price-earnings on the various innovation measures (Model 4).  
In Model 3 we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient for idiosyncratic 
risk, at the 5% level in the whole sample as well as in the pharma sample. No relevant 
relationship is found when considering the biotech sample. The best estimates are 
obtained when IR is entered, respectively for the whole, pharma and biotech samples, 
with 1 lag, 2 lags and contemporaneously.  The lack of evidence in favor of the Pastor 
and Veronesi (2004) hypothesis in the biotech sample is potentially related to the 
                                            
30
 Pastor and Veronesi (2004) use the Market to Book ratio (M/B), which replaces the P/D ratio employed in 
the theoretical derivations of Gordon’s growth formula, on the grounds that dividends are not paid out by 
small start ups. We instead use P/E instead of P/D since both earnings and dividends, are proxies for the 
“fundamental” value underlying stock movements. 
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relevant reduction in sample dimension due to missing values for P/E. By relaxing the 
minimum presence criterion from 8 years to 5 years, the relationship turns out significant, 
even if only at a 10% level. The relationship between the level of price-earnings and the 
volatility of firm specific returns, also finds support in the empirical literature on the high 
frequency relationship between prices (or returns) and market volatility31.    
  
Model 4 Price earnings and innovation 
 
Finally, we regress P/E on the various innovation variables used above. Considering the 
whole sample estimates, R&D intensity is always significant at the 5% level, but unlike 
Model 1 and 2, the patent count variable is insignificant. Weighted patents are instead 
positive and significant at the 5% level. The lag structure is consistent with that obtained 
for Models 2 and 3 (see discussion on lag structure above).   
 
As already discussed, the biotech dummy is positive and significant, indicating that on 
average biotech firms have a P/E ratio 30% higher than the sample mean.   This is to be 
expected given that small innovative biotech firms often have low earnings, so that their 
stock valuation is determined largely by their investment in innovation (note the higher 
mean P/E for biotech firms in Table 1).    
 
Considering the pharma section estimates, results are basically unchanged, with both 
R&D intensity and PATW coefficients (Model 4c) increasing significance from the 5% 
level to the 1% level. Differently, when the regressions are conducted employing the 
biotech sample, both PAT and PATW are insignificant, while R&D intensity is significant 
at the 1% level.   
 
In sum, the positive relationship emerging between P/E and innovation provides support 
to the rational bubble model in Pastor and Veronesi (2004; 2005) where it is assumed, 
but not proved, that P/E should be higher for firms that introduce radical technologies.   
                                            
31
 The rationale is that increasing portfolio risk is compensated by augmented expected returns. The finding 
of an often significant coefficient for volatility in returns regressions conducted with ARCH-in mean 
specifications in GARCH modeling for financial time series directly accounts for this relationship.  
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6. Conclusion   
 
Our study provides empirical support to the assumption found in recent finance literature 
that the volatility of stock prices (both aggregate and idiosyncratic) is related to 
innovation.  We use firm level R&D and patent data (citation weighted) to test whether 
firms that are ‘more innovative’ are characterized by higher (than average) volatility of 
stock returns and levels of market value and P/E.  We find that both the level and 
volatility of stock prices is in fact related to innovation.  In particular, the positive 
correlation between innovation and idiosyncratic risk —provides us with important 
insights on how changes in the ‘real’ structure of production affect stock price volatility, 
beyond common explanations related to irrational’ exuberance and ‘animal spirits’.  
 
The lag structure of the innovation variables provides insights into the speed at which 
the market reacts to innovation ‘signals’.  Lags are higher for R&D than for patents, 
suggesting that the market reacts more quickly to signals regarding innovation outputs 
than inputs.  In fact, it is sensible to think that uncertainty is in fact highest at the time a 
patent is applied for, since this includes the uncertainty regarding whether the patent will 
be granted, as well as uncertainty regarding the effect of the patent (if granted) on firm 
growth. This is especially true in the pharma industry where there is a high patenting rate 
but a very low rate of new drug discovery (Orsenigo, Dosi and Mazzucato 2006).  Pisano 
(2006), in fact, claims that one way that the pharma and biotech industries differs from 
other high tech industries, such as computers and software, is the profound and 
persistent uncertainty of the R&D process due to the limited knowledge of human 
biological systems (as opposed to chemical or electronic)32.    
 
We find that volatility is higher in the case of small firms (proxied by market share) and in 
the post 1985 period, characterized by a more guided search regime (due to scientific 
and organizational changes discussed in Gambardella 1995).  The higher volatility in the 
latter period is most likely related to the fact that this period is characterized by an 
‘inflation’ of patents (due to the effect of the 1980 Bayh-Dole act on patenting behavior), 
which reduces their reliability as a ‘signal’ of real innovation (hence more mistakes made 
by investors).  Though the fact that weighted patents have a stronger effect on volatility 
(as well as P/E) than simple patent counts, suggests that the market is able to, at least 
partially, filter through this noise.  
 
Support is found for the ‘rational bubble’ hypothesis in Pastor and Veronesi (2004), 
through the positive relationship between the P/E ratio and the innovation variables (as 
well as through the positive relationship found between P/E and idiosyncratic risk).  
Interestingly, it is only in Model 4 (with P/E as the dependent variable), that the patent 
yield variable proves significant, suggesting that of all the dependent variables tested, it 
is P/E that best captures the ‘efficiency’ of the innovative process (more output per 
innovation input).  This supports the view that price-earnings are guided by expected 
future profitability of highly innovative firms. The fact that most biotech companies have 
no earnings (except the very big ones like Amgen and Genentech), means in fact that 
their value is determined almost exclusively by expectations regarding their ongoing 
innovation projects. Yet the fact that the R&D process is so lengthy and the projects so 
uncertain, means that valuation of firms is full of mistakes.  The corrections that emerge 
                                            
32
 This is one of the reasons for its low R&D productivity, a delusion for those that hoped that biotech’s more 
nimble structure would save pharma’s low turnout of new drugs. 
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from this trial and error process are no doubt partly responsible for the stock return 
volatility associated with the various innovation variables.  
 
An interesting aspect of our results is that we reproduce the basic findings in the market 
value and innovation literature (HJT 2005) using flow rather than stock variables (for 
both R&D and patents), suggesting that more work should be done looking at the 
different effect of innovation flows and stocks on stock prices.  We had conjectured that 
flows are more relevant when studying volatility dynamics, but they are also relevant in 
explaining changes in the level of market value.  Another area that we wish to explore 
further is how stock price dynamics respond to particular characteristics of innovation, 
i.e. the degree to which patents are more ‘general’ or ‘original’ (as defined in Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg 2002, see fn 7), and the temporal dimension of patent citations (recent vs. 
old citations, which is also  related to the issue of flows vs. stocks above).  
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Figure 1  
Number of Firms (1962-1999)
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Figure 2 Dynamic correlations    
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Figure 3  Innovation and market share instability 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
WHOLE MKTVAL PE IR_SP500 IR_IND RD/REV PAT PATW PATYIELD
 Mean 5917.147 86.381 0.088 0.085 0.094 8.309 1.457 0.124
 Median 787.646 25.408 0.071 0.071 0.054 1.000 0.058 0.001
 Maximum 171234.700 9926.505 0.779 2.222 8.413 155.000 69.818 12.870
 Minimum 1.697 0.423 -0.029 -0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 17573.270 427.242 0.072 0.112 0.327 17.527 4.201 0.566
 Skewness 5.328 16.312 2.685 9.574 18.844 3.325 9.132 14.757
 Kurtosis 35.938 324.173 17.848 167.215 434.910 16.536 121.885 288.691
PHARMA MKTVAL PE IR_SP500 IR_IND RD/REV PAT PATW PATYIELD
 Mean 7166.306 43.123 0.077 0.081 0.119 9.530 1.237 0.091
 Median 998.557 22.768 0.063 0.068 0.078 1.000 0.105 0.003
 Maximum 171234.700 4108.527 0.420 0.420 8.413 118.000 22.000 3.890
 Minimum 1.697 4.357 -0.029 -0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 19589.670 158.310 0.058 0.061 0.366 18.407 2.598 0.288
 Skewness 4.724 21.204 1.503 1.135 17.009 2.772 3.846 6.548
 Kurtosis 28.515 531.733 6.691 6.210 350.434 11.392 21.954 59.816
BIOTECH MKTVAL PE IR_SP500 IR_IND RD/REV PAT PATW PATYIELD
 Mean 1422.355 242.034 0.126 0.101 0.004 3.913 2.252 0.240
 Median 234.938 56.036 0.105 0.082 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Maximum 39131.630 9926.505 0.779 2.222 0.066 155.000 69.818 12.870
 Minimum 3.731 0.423 -0.027 -0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 3708.635 848.918 0.100 0.209 0.006 13.023 7.499 1.077
 Skewness 6.007 8.576 2.778 6.393 5.693 8.181 6.559 9.124
 Kurtosis 52.096 87.553 14.786 60.349 52.081 85.894 51.626 96.567  
  
Table 2a  Model selection tests (whole sample) 
Equation Step Test Hypotheses Chi-sq (5) P Selected
1a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 3795.39 0.000 RE
1a 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 170.37 0.000 FE
1b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 4041.80 0.000 RE
1b 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 114.41 0.000 FE
1c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 3964.02 0.000 RE
1c 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 126.64 0.000 FE
2a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 4.87 0.027 RE
2a 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 2.36 0.501 RE
2b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 5.75 0.016 RE
2b 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 4.20 0.379 RE
2c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 6.23 0.012 RE
2c 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 4.78 0.310 RE
3 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 231.69 0.000 RE
3 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 8.21 0.042 FE
4a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 236.95 0.000 RE
4a 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 3.25 0.354 RE
4b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 237.10 0.000 RE
4b 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 3.57 0.467 RE
4c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 239.06 0.000 RE
4c 2 Hausman H0: RE;    H1: FE 3.85 0.427 RE
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Table 2b  Model selection tests (pharma sample) 
Equation Step Test Hypotheses Chi-sq (5) P Selected
1a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 2057.92 0.000 RE
1a 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 85.86 0.000 FE
1b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 2503.12 0.000 RE
1b 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 85.61 0.000 FE
1c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 2346.28 0.000 RE
1c 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 221.51 0.000 FE
2a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 195.20 0.000 RE
2a 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 27.59 0.000 FE
2b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 195.50 0.000 RE
2b 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 32.87 0.000 FE
2c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 193.93 0.000 RE
2c 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 33.43 0.000 FE
3 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 124.99 0.000 RE
3 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 9.49 0.023 FE
4a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 150.38 0.000 RE
4a 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 3.3 0.347 RE
4b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 150.60 0.000 RE
4b 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 4.71 0.318 RE
4c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 149.78 0.000 RE
4c 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 5.66 0.226 RE
 
 
Table 2c  Model selection tests (biotech sample) 
Equation S tep Test Hypotheses Chi-sq (5) P Selected
1a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 1226.74 0.000 RE
1a 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 10.92 0.012 FE
1b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 1091.50 0.000 RE
1b 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 9.72 0.045 FE
1c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 1104.62 0.000 RE
1c 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 9.64 0.048 FE
2a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 0.44 0.505 POO L
2b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 0.63 0.427 POO L
2c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 0.59 0.442 POO L
3 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 59.66 0.000 RE
3 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 104.82 0.000 FE
4a 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 65.10 0.000 RE
4a 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 15.60 0.001 FE
4b 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 70.07 0.000 RE
4b 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 15.38 0.004 FE
4c 1 Breush-Pagan H0: Pool;  H1: RE 69.00 0.000 RE
4c 2 Hausm an H0: RE;    H1: FE 14.53 0.005 FE
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Table 3 Estimation results (whole sample) 
Model (Spec) Const / [s.e.] Contr / [s.e.] Dummy BIO* Dummy 85 Regr.1 (lag) Est / [s.e] Regr.2 (lag) Est / [s.e]
     1 - Dep variable: log MKTVAL;    Number of obs = 1591, sectional dimension = 134 
1a (FE) 3.697*** 15.794*** 1.494*** log RDREV(2) 0.161*** - -
[0.070] [1.305] [-] [0.073] [0.055] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.330; between = 0.111; overall = 0.192 
F(3, 1454) = 238.70, Prob > F = 0.000
1b (FE) 3.635*** 15.498*** 1.578*** log RDREV(2) 0.153*** log PAT(1) 0.383***
[0.071] [1.294] [-] [0.072] [0.054] [0.071]
R-sq: within = 0.343; between = 0.203; overall = 0.271 
F(4, 1453) = 189.87, Prob > F = 0.000
1c (FE) 3.651*** 15.723*** 1.615*** log RDREV(2) 0.151*** log PATW(1) 0.283***
[0.071] [1.297] [-] [0.072] [0.055] [0.065]
R-sq: within = 0.338; between = 0.182; overall = 0.254
F(4, 1453) = 185.88, Prob > F = 0.000
     2 - Dep variable: log IDRISK;    Number of obs = 1459, sectional dimension = 134 
2a (RE) 0.114*** -0.475*** 0.035** 0.013 log RDREV(2) 0.019** - -
[0.017] [0.189] [0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.002; between = 0.094; overall = 0.046 
Wald chi2 (4) = 16.95, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
2b (RE) 0.112*** -0.637*** 0.035** 0.008 log RDREV(2) 0.020** log PAT(1) 0.027**
[0.017] [0.202] [0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [0.012]
R-sq: within = 0.004; between = 0.120; overall = 0.046 
Wald chi2 (5) = 22.27, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
2c (RE) 0.112*** -0.643*** 0.036** 0.008 log RDREV(2) 0.020** log PATW(1) 0.030***
[0.014] [0.197] [0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [0.012]
R-sq: within = 0.005; between = 0.138; overall = 0.046 
Wald chi2 (5) = 24.54, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
      3 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 764, sectional dimension = 77 
3 (FE) 3.035*** -0.783 0.351*** log IR(1) 1.075** - -
[0.085] [1.415] [-] [0.063] [0.521] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.051; between = 0.091; overall = 0.111 
F(3, 684) = 12.26, Prob > F = 0.000
     4 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 775, sectional dimension = 79 
4a (RE) 2.966*** -1.117 0.803*** 0.348*** log RDREV(3) 0.552** - -
[0.152] [1.071] [0.227] [0.064] [0.261] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.041; between = 0.208; overall = 0.255 
Wald chi2 (4) = 51.36, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
4b (RE) 2.953*** -0.985 0.796*** 0.321*** log RDREV(3) 0.558** log PAT(2) 0.100
[0.152] [1.075] [0.227] [0.067] [0.261] [0.076]
R-sq: within = 0.043; between = 0213; overall = 0.245 
Wald chi2 (4) = 53.12, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
4c (RE) 2.953*** -0.929 0.795*** 0.310*** log RDREV(3) 0.534** log PATW(2) 0.146**
[0.152] [1.074] [0.228] [0.066] [0.261] [0.070]
R-sq: within = 0.048; between = 0.207; overall = 0.243 
Wald chi2 (4) = 55.68, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
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Table 4  Estimation results (pharma sample) 
Model (Spec) Const / [s.e.] Contr / [s.e.] Dummy 85 Regr.1 (lag) Est / [s.e] Regr.2 (lag) Est / [s.e]
     1 - Dep variable: log MKTVAL;    Number of obs = 825, sectional dimension = 63 
1a (FE) 4.381*** 19.940*** 1.781*** log RDREV(3) 0.186*** - -
[0.091] [2.334] [0.078] [0.060] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.454; between = 0.131; overall = 0.318
F(3, 759) = 210.39, Prob > F = 0.000
1b (FE) 4.170*** 19.258*** 1.522*** log RDREV(3) 0.157*** log PAT(1) 1.015***
[0.091] [2.229] [0.080] [0.057] [0.117]
R-sq: within = 0.503; between = 0.360; overall = 0.477 
F(4, 758) = 192.11, Prob > F = 0.000
1c (FE) 4.257*** 19.050*** 1.633*** log RDREV(3) 0.158*** log PATW(1) 0.631***
[0.092] [2.285] [0.080] [0.059] [0.103]
R-sq: within = 0.480; between = 0.273; overall = 0.418 
F(4, 758) = 174.79, Prob > F = 0.000
     2 - Dep variable: log IDRISK;    Number of obs = 845, sectional dimension = 63 
2a (FE) 0.091*** -0.169 0.012** log RDREV(1) 0.019*** - -
[0.006] [0.151] [0.005] [0.004] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.045; between = 0.264; overall = 0.097 
F(3, 779) = 12.27, Prob > F = 0.000
2b (FE) 0.088*** -0.137 0.008 log RDREV(1) 0.019*** log PAT(1) 0.017**
[0.006] [0.151] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
R-sq: within = 0.051; between = 0.074; overall = 0.015 
F(4, 778) = 10.57, Prob > F = 0.000
2c (FE) 0.088*** -0.133 0.009 log RDREV(1) 0.019*** log PATW(1) 0.016***
[0.006] [0.152] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
R-sq: within = 0.052; between = 0.095; overall = 0.023 
F(4, 778) = 10.65, Prob > F = 0.000
      3 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 573, sectional dimension = 47 
3 (FE) 2.889*** -3.404 0.398*** log IR(2) 1.278** - -
[0.114] [2.337] [0.058] [0.637] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.102; between = 0.204; overall = 0.186 
F(3, 1454) = 238.70, Prob > F = 0.000
     4 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 593, sectional dimension = 48 
4a (RE) 3.051*** -4.193** 0.404*** log RDREV(3) 0.453** - -
[0.122] [1.766] [0.056] [0.217] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.087; between = 0.290; overall = 0.223 
Wald chi2 (3) = 70.07, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
4b (RE) 3.042*** -4.593*** 0.374*** log RDREV(3) 0.454** log PAT(2) 0.112
[0.123] [1.792] [0.060] [0.218] [0.081]
R-sq: within = 0.092; between = 0.286; overall = 0.219
Wald chi2 (4) = 71.71, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
4c (RE) 3.042*** -4.856*** 0.357*** log RDREV(3) 0.427*** log PATW(2) 0.186***
[0.123] [1.788] [0.059] [0.217] [0.071]
R-sq: within = 0.100; between = 0.286; overall = 0.220 
Wald chi2 (4) = 76.64, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
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Table 5  Estimation results (biotech sample) 
Model (Spec) Const / [s.e.] Contr / [s.e.] Dummy 85 Regr.1 (lag) Est / [s.e] Regr.2 (lag) Est / [s.e]
     1 - Dep variable: log MKTVAL;    Number of obs = 728, sectional dimension = 71 
1a (FE) 3.490*** 13.048*** 0.988*** log RDREV(2) 0.277* - -
[0.187] [1.545] [0.184] [0.171] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.123; between = 0.371; overall = 0.347
F(3, 654) = 30.65, Prob > F = 0.000
1b (FE) 4.479*** 13.231*** 0.887*** log RDREV(2) 0.263 log PAT(2) 0.277***
[0.186] [1.537] [0.186] [0.176] [0.092]
R-sq: within = 0.135; between = 0.411; overall = 0.387
F(4, 653) = 25.54, Prob > F = 0.000
1c (FE) 3.501*** 13.570*** 0.870*** log RDREV(2) 0.258 log PATW(2) 0.278***
[0.0186] [1.542] [0.187] [0.176] [0.086]
R-sq: within = 0.137; between = 0.411; overall = 0.388
F(4, 653) = 25.93, Prob > F = 0.000
   2 - Dep variable: log IDRISK;    Number of obs = 636, sectional dimension = 71 
2a (POOL) 0.168*** -0.454* -0.012 log RDREV(2) 0.015 - -
[0.056] [0.262] [0.055] [0.051] [-]
Adj R-sq = 0.005
F(3, 632) = 1.08, Prob > F = 0.358
2b (POOL) 0.162*** -0.723** -0.017 log RDREV(2) 0.020 log PAT(1) 0.045**
[0.055] [0.290] [0.055] [0.051] [0.021]
Adj R-sq = 0.012
F(43, 632) = 1.94, Prob > F = 0.102
2c (POOL) 0.165*** -0.749*** -0.022 log RDREV(2) 0.020 log PATW(1) 0.054***
[0.055] [0.284] [0.055] [0.050] [0.020]
Adj R-sq = 0.016
F(4, 631) = 2.56, Prob > F = 0.037
      3 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 161, sectional dimension = 30 
3 (FE) 4.678*** -6.958*** 0.353 log IR(0) 1.307 - -
[0.375] [2.850] [0.331] [1.241] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.077; between = 0.082; overall = 0.040
F(3, 128) = 3.55, Prob > F = 0.016
     4 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 182, sectional dimension = 31 
4a (FE) 4.261*** -1.602 -0.358 log RDREV(3) 0.495*** - -
[0.373] [2.002] [0.339] [0.113] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.135; between = 0.001; overall = 0.017
F(3, 148) = 7.71, Prob > F = 0.000
4b (FE) 4.268*** -1.625 -0.352 log RDREV(3) 0.496*** log PAT(2) -0.018
[0.379] [2.021] [0.345] [0.113] [0.173]
R-sq: within = 0.135; between = 0.001; overall = 0.015
F(4, 147) = 5.75, Prob > F = 0.000
4c (FE) 4.259*** -1.585 -0.363 log RDREV(3) 0.495*** log PATW(2) 0.012
[0.375] [2.022] [0.349] [0.113] [0.164]
R-sq: within = 0.135; between = 0.001; overall = 0.017
F(4, 147) = 5.75, Prob > F = 0.000
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Table 6 Robustness (whole sample, final specifications only) 
Model (Spec) Const / [s.e.] Contr / [s.e.] Dummy BIO* Dummy 85 Regr.1 (lag) Est / [s.e] Regr.2 (lag) Est / [s.e]
     1 - Dep variable: log MKTVAL;    Number of obs = 1591, sectional dimension = 134 
1c (FE) 3.651*** 15.723*** 1.615*** log RDREV(2) 0.151*** log PATW(1) 0.283***
[0.071] [1.297] [-] [0.072] [0.055] [0.065]
R-sq: within = 0.338; between = 0.182; overall = 0.254
F(4, 1453) = 185.88, Prob > F = 0.000
1c (RE) 3.805*** 17.959*** -1.027*** 1.554*** log RDREV(2) 0.081 log PATW(1) 0.357***
[0.196] [1.297] [0.256] [.072] [0.053] [0.064]
R-sq: within = 0.332; between = 0.370; overall = 0.470
Wald chi2 (5) = 798.01, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
1c (Pool) 4.741*** 27.962*** -1.570*** 0.851*** log RDREV(2) -0.575*** log PATW(1) 0.665***
[0.096] [1.021] [0.085] [0.107] [0.062] [0.070]
R-sq:  = 0.570
F(5, 1585) = 419.87, Prob > F = 0.000
     2 - Dep variable: log IDRISK;    Number of obs = 1459, sectional dimension = 134 
2c (FE) 0.124*** -0.418*** 0.000 log RDREV(2) 0.010 log PATW(1) 0.028**
[0.015] [0.296] [-] [.015] [0.011] [0.014]
R-sq: within = 0.005; between = 0.109; overall = 0.024 
F(4, 1321) = 1.750, Prob > F = 0.136
2c (RE) 0.112*** -0.643*** 0.036** 0.008 log RDREV(2) 0.020** log PATW(1) 0.030***
[0.014] [0.197] [0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [0.012]
R-sq: within = 0.005; between = 0.138; overall = 0.046 
Wald chi2 (5) = 24.54, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
2c (Pool) 0.099*** -0.683*** 0.037*** 0.018 log RDREV(2) 0.026*** log PATW(1) 0.019**
[0.012] [0.132] [0.010] [0.013] [0.007] [0.008]
R-sq:  = 0.049
F(5, 1453) = 15.020, Prob > F = 0.000
      3 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 764, sectional dimension = 77 
3 (FE) 3.035*** -0.783 0.351*** log IR(1) 1.075** - -
[0.085] [1.415] [-] [0.063] [0.521] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.051; between = 0.091; overall = 0.111 
F(3, 684) = 12.26, Prob > F = 0.000
3 (RE) 2.974*** 0.068 0.675*** 0.360*** log IR(1) 1.215** - -
[0.163] [1.234] [0.237] [0.062] [0.549] [-]
R-sq: within = 0.050; between = 0.151; overall = 0.217 
Wald chi2 (4) =  51.23, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
3 (Pool) 2.516*** 1.523** 0.810*** 0.525*** log IR(1) 2.682*** - -
[0.088] [0.693] [0.087] [0.076] [0.640] [-]
R-sq: = 0.223
F(4, 759) = 54.63, Prob > F = 0.000
     4 - Dep variable: log PE;    Number of obs = 775, sectional dimension = 79 
4c (FE) 3.017*** 1.091 0.295*** log RDREV(3) 0.222 log PATW(2) 0.164**
[0.078] [1.188] [-] [0.067] [0.332] [0.075]
R-sq: within = 0.049; between = 0.118; overall = 0.086 
F(4, 692) = 8.87, Prob > F = 0.000
4c (RE) 2.953*** 0.929 0.795*** 0.310*** log RDREV(3) 0.534** log PATW(2) 0.146**
[0.152] [1.074] [0.228] [0.066] [0.261] [0.070]
R-sq: within = 0.048; between = 0.207; overall = 0.243 
Wald chi2 (4) = 55.68, Prob > chi2 = 0.000
4c (Pool) 2.675*** 0.434 0.996*** 0.466*** log RDREV(3) 1.078*** log PATW(2) 0.053
[0.066] [0.710] [0.086] [0.077] [0.192] [0.055]
R-sq: = 0.262
F(5, 769) = 54.69, Prob > F = 0.000
  
